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Journal Articles

Development of training course on non-destructive assay of nuclear material for Asian region, 2; Development of lectures and exercises on gamma-ray measurement

Yamamoto, Masahiko; Kono, Soma; Saegusa, Yu; Kuno, Takehiko; Sekine, Megumi; Inoue, Naoko; Noro, Naoko; Rodriguez, D.; Yamaguchi, Tomoki; Stinett, J.*

Proceedings of INMM & ESARDA Joint Annual Meeting 2023 (Internet), 10 Pages, 2023/05

The gamma-ray measurement part of the Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) course of safeguards and nuclear material accountancy was developed to focus on gamma-ray measurement allotting two days out of five days. The lectures on the basic characteristics and detection methods and mechanism of gamma-ray detectors were provided as e-learnings which were developed. The part for hands-on exercises were implemented in JAEA facility. Participants have set up each gamma-ray detector, and performed measurements of uranium and the other gamma-ray emitting nuclides. Also, uranium-235 enrichment measurements have been performed. In addition, the participants trained with a handheld gamma-ray spectrometer, HM-5, that is popular for IAEA safeguards as the preparation in the measurement exercise of fresh fuel assemblies in JRR-3, a research reactor facility of JAEA. This paper reports on the development, implementation, and feedback from participants on gamma-ray measurement part of the NDA course.

JAEA Reports

Research on factor analysis and technical process for achieving denuclearization; Denuclearization of South Africa

Tazaki, Makiko; Kimura, Takashi; Shimizu, Ryo; Tamai, Hiroshi; Nakatani, Takayoshi; Suda, Kazunori

JAEA-Review 2022-056, 54 Pages, 2023/01

JAEA-Review-2022-056.pdf:1.86MB

As part of the "Research on Factor Analysis and Technical Processes for Achieving Denuclearization" South Africa's nuclear development and denuclearization cases were investigated then analyzed from seven denuclearization factors namely (1) motivation for nuclear development, (2) internal and external situations at the time of denuclearization decision, (3) progress of nuclear development, (4) effects of sanctions, (5) incentives for denuclearization, (6) international framework for denuclearization, (7) denuclearization and verification methods. At the same time, characteristics of its denuclearization and lessons learned from the denuclearization were also analyzed. South Africa shifted its nuclear activities from research and development of "peaceful nuclear detonation" in the 1970s to developing "limited nuclear deterrence" and finally to manufacturing "transportable nuclear weapons" in the late 1980s. By then, it had completed producing six nuclear explosive devices using highly enriched uranium. However, in 1989, along with the abolition of the apartheid policy, South Africa decided denuclearization and dismantled its nuclear explosive devices and related facilities. Upon completion of dismantlement, it joined the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The South Africa has remained one of the rare countries that has continued to the peaceful use nuclear energy, and its voluntary denuclearization is considered as a good example of denuclearization in the future.

JAEA Reports

The New U.S.-ROK civil nuclear cooperation agreement

Tazaki, Makiko; Shimizu, Ryo; Suda, Kazunori

JAEA-Review 2016-019, 118 Pages, 2016/10

JAEA-Review-2016-019.pdf:4.73MB

In November 2015, the new nuclear cooperation agreement between US and ROK entered into force. A top priority of their negotiation for revising their old agreement was whether or not the US grants its advanced consent to the ROK engagement in uranium enrichment and pyroprocessing of US-origin nuclear material. Under the new agreement, in principle, the ROK is able to conduct uranium enrichment and reprocessing at certain facilities prescribed in Annexes III and II to the Agreed Minute of the new agreement. However, as of the date of validation of the agreement, no facilities are prescribed in both Annexes. It means that the US does not grant its advanced consent to ROK such activities. The new agreement allows the US adherence of its nuclear nonproliferation policy, while it also allows ROK future possibility of engaging such activities. Such result can be analyzed that the new agreement was a product of reality-based and maximal compromise among the US and ROK.

JAEA Reports

Current status of a decommissioning project in the Enrichment Engineering Facilities; Results in the first-half of the fiscal year of 2014

Matsumoto, Takashi; Morimoto, Yasuyuki; Takahashi, Nobuo; Takata, Masaharu; Yoshida, Hideaki; Nakashima, Shinichi; Ishimori, Yuu

JAEA-Technology 2015-036, 60 Pages, 2016/01

JAEA-Technology-2015-036.pdf:9.15MB

The Enrichment Engineering Facilities of the Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center was constructed in order to establish the technical basis of the uranium enrichment plant in Japan. Uranium enrichment tests, using natural and reprocessed uranium, were carried out from 1979 to 1990 at two types of plants in the facilities. UF $_{6}$ handling equipment and Supplemental equipment in these plants are intended to be dismantled by 2019 in order to make places for future projects, for example, inventory investigation, precipitation treatment, etc. This report shows the basic plan of this decommissioning project and presents the current state of dismantling in the first-half of the fiscal year of 2014, with indicating its schedule, procedure, situation, results, and so on. The dismantled materials generated amounted to 37 mesh containers and 199 drums, and the secondary waste generated amounted to 271.4 kg.